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BEYOND CONGRESS: THE STUDY OF
STATE AND LOCAL LEGISLATURES
Richard A. Briffault*
I'd like to thank the Journal of Legislation and Public Policy for
inviting me back to N.Y.U. I am particularly grateful to have the opportunity to sit between and learn from Bill Eskridge and Beth Garrett,
who have once again demonstrated in their comments today why they
are leaders in this field. I understand now what it must have been like
to be a student in a class with Eskridge as the professor and Garrett as
a fellow student-can you imagine what an experience that must have
been?
I am going to focus my remarks on state and local legislatures,
and on the legislative process at the subnational level. I think this is
useful because the discussion of legislation often turns into a consideration of statutory interpretation, which typically is about courts. Of
course, focusing on courts in a discussion of legislation is entirely appropriate, given the role the courts play in interpreting the products of
legislation. But most legislation is never the subject of judicial consideration. The study of legislation needs to consider legislatures
themselves and the processes of enacting legislation.
In his book, Law and Disagreement, my colleague Jeremy Waldron nicely put his finger on one of the key features of the legislature,
which is its multiplicity of membership-its plurality of voices.' Judicial decisions represent the determinations of a single judge, or a
three judge panel, or nine justices on the Supreme Court. But New
York's City Council has fifty-one members, and the State Assembly
has 150 members. Four hundred thirty-five men and women make up
the House of Representatives. Indeed, at the federal level, you have
536 elected decision makers-Representatives, Senators, and the President-jointly engaged in making legislation.
The size of the legislature generates the collective action
problems that are characteristic of any pluralistic society: How do you
aggregate preferences? How do you build majorities? How do you
stabilize decisions? How do you reconcile the competing values of
* Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Law School.
JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 10, 49-50 (1999).
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representativeness, deliberation, expertise (which we may feel judges
lack in substantive policy areas), and information-gathering (another
area in which judges fall short and must depend on litigants), all of
which characterize the legislature? Ultimately, how do the members
of the legislature collaborate to produce effective governance?
One way to consider this is by studying Congress, which is something nearly all scholars of legislation do. But we should all recognize
that we are a part of a federal system in which the vast majority of
legislation is enacted at the subnational level. Indeed, the vast majority of governance-basically everything important except for foreign
relations, economic security, and transfer payments-occurs at the
subnational level. State and local governments are primarily responsible for criminal justice, public safety, education, land use regulation,
and neighborhoods. The vast majority of the public's interactions
with government involve local or state governments. State and local
legislatures are, thus, intrinsically important to the study of American
government. Moreover, the differences between the federal legislature and the subnational legislatures, and among the many state and
local legislatures, provide an important perspective for considering
such fundamental questions of the legislative process as the aggregation of preferences, the construction of majorities, and the stabilization
of decisions.
A lot of what I do involves actually looking at how legislatures
work. To be sure, I don't look at them all-with Congress, the fifty
states, and thousands of county and municipal legislatures to consider,
a comprehensive analysis is well beyond my individual capacity. But
even a more limited consideration of the variations among state and
local legislatures aids the analysis of legislatures and the legislative
process.
One characteristic of legislatures at the state and local level is
very strong partisan leadership-this is increasing in Congress as
well, but it is still not as significant a factor in Congress as it is in
some states and localities. In many state legislatures, most of the legislature is literally irrelevant. In New York, we talk about "three men
in a room"-that is, the governor and the leaders of each of the two
legislative houses-who make the legislative decisions; there often is
no real legislative vote. The legislature uses something called the fast
roll call, in which the clerk of the State Senate calls the senator listed
first alphabetically, the majority leader, the minority leader, and the
senator listed last alphabetically. The party leaders may cast votes for
all the senators from their party unless the leader has been informed
specifically that a member is absent or has chosen to break with the

Imaged with the Permission of NYU Journal of Legislation and Public Policy

2003]

THE STUDY OF STATE AND LOCAL LEGISLATURES

25

party position, which is extremely rare. There was an interesting case
in New York a few years ago in which the crucial vote was cast by a
party leader on behalf of a senator who was in the hospital at the time
the vote was taken-and who subsequently stated that he had informed his party leader that he had intended to oppose the party on the
bill. The court, noting that in the legislative session in which the dispute arose 97.9% of Senate bills voted on passed on fast roll call
2
votes, declined to disturb the outcome of the vote.
The New York legislature may be an extreme case, but it is not
unique in the central role that partisanship plays. Although few states
give party leaders the authority to cast votes for their members, in
many stateg the party leaders strongly dominate the legislative agenda.
So, too, in most state legislatures the committee system is quite weak.
Some, like New York, do not have conference committees for resolving intercameral differences; that job is left to the party leaders themselves. Most local legislatures have very weak committee systems;
indeed, many have no committee systems at all. Consistent with
strong party leadership and weak committees, many state legislatures
employ significant centralized research staffs. California is famous
for its legislative service. While in some states the research arms are
relatively independent, in others they work closely with and for the
leadership and don't provide services to other members of the
legislature.
Another difference between Congress and subnational legislatures involves the role of legislative history in statutory interpretation.
In recent years, much ink has been spilled concerning the propriety of
resorting to legislative history in interpreting statutes, but that debate
is largely irrelevant to state and local legislation since most states and
localities have no legislative histories. There are no committee reports-particularly when there are no committees. There are few
floor debates and few reports concerning floor debates. At most, legislatures may retain general statements by a bill's sponsors, newspaper
accounts of the politics surrounding enactment, and perhaps a signing
statement by the governor. This necessarily requires a different approach to statutory interpretation at the subnational level.
State legislative rules and practices can also affect how we think
about some of the norms central to the study of legislature, such as
deliberation and expertise. Many states by their constitutions limit the
duration of legislative sessions to a certain number of months. In
some states, for example, the legislature may be in session for just two
2.

Heimbach v. State, 454 N.Y.S.2d 993 (App. Div. 1982).
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months out of every two years. Limits on state legislative sessions
have been liberalized in recent years, but there still are a number of
states where legislative sessions are just 60 days-that's it. They've
got to get their lawmaking business done in a very short time.
The combination of strong party leadership, the absence of committees, and temporally limited sessions can result in very fast action.
One of the themes that looms large in the literature about legislatures
and legislative processes is deliberation, but there isn't a lot of deliberation in state and local legislatures. There may be a negotiation session with the three men in a room, but there is not a great deal of
public deliberation in legislative committees or the legislature itself.
The possibilities for deliberation at the local level may also be
limited by the absence of bicameralism. Legislative scholars struggling to make sense of bicameralism in the era of one person, one
vote, where both houses of a state legislature are elected by the same
electorate to represent the same electorate, have focused on the role
that bicameralism can play in promoting deliberation. By requiring a
bill to pass two legislative houses, the bicameral structure increases
the opportunity for dialogue, debate, and the discovery and correction
of whatever flaws may exist in a legislative proposal. But all local
legislatures are unicameral; whatever deliberation occurs has to occur
in a single chamber. I am not aware of any studies of how this affects
the quality of legislative outputs, but it does change the dynamic of the
legislative process.
Legislative expertise is increasingly shaped and constrained at
the subnational level by legislative term limits. There are no term
limits on members of Congress, but many state and local legislatures
are subject to term limits. In the 2001 election, two-thirds of the
membership of the New York City Council-as well as the office of
Mayor-turned over because of term limits. 3 Suddenly, New York
City's legislative process was in the hands of freshmen. The new
speaker of the City Council was in just his sixth year on the Council,
but, as a result of term limits, he was also one of the Council's most
senior members.
Another distinctive feature of local legislatures is their frequent
focus on very narrow, specialized matters. One of the goals of legislative reform has been to get legislatures to think broadly about policy
questions rather than to write laws for specific individuals. In an effort to promote public interest-oriented lawmaking, most state consti3. Scott Shifrel, Council Gets a Makeover: New Faces to Fill 38 Seats,
(New York), Nov. 7, 2001, at 29.
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tutions ban what is called special legislation. At both the state and
national levels, legislatures have generally gotten out of the business
of issuing pensions to individuals, granting divorces, or resolving individual immigration disputes. Local legislatures are engaged with narrowly focused matters all the time-they are busy renaming streets,
rezoning individual plots of land, and handling other very minor matters. They are legislatures, but they are frequently concerned with a
very different type of legislation.
For many local legislatures, and for some state legislatures, an
important question is whether legislative membership is considered a
full-time or a part-time activity. This affects the salaries members are
paid, conflict of interest rules and other ethical norms, and other aspects of legislative behavior. A state or local legislature-where
many members are engaged in an outside legal practice or in running
an insurance or real estate agency-may be more closely connected to
the public than a legislature composed solely of full-time legislators,
but the members' outside business activities also complicate their ability to promote the public interest. In short, state and local governments raise interesting and difficult issues concerning legislative
deliberation, expertise, interest issues about representativeness, and
public-interest models of legislative decision making.
The study of subnational legislative bodies also gives us some
perspective on separation of powers questions, particularly on the relationship between the executive and legislative branches. When legislation scholars talk about the separation of powers, they are often
focused on the relationship between the political branches and the
courts. But executive-legislative relations have important implications
for legislation since the veto-wielding executive is a crucial member
of the legislative decision-making process, even though he or she is
not technically part of the legislature.
State and local governments have developed veto structures that
can vary sharply from the federal veto structure. At the national level,
the president's veto power is a fairly blunt instrument. The president
can veto a bill or not, but has no opportunity to modify a bill once it
has emerged from Congress. In the vast majority of states, however,
the governor has an item veto for budgetary matters, which enables
the executive to pick a bill apart by vetoing some sections, deleting
portions of a bill while accepting the rest. 4 This presents an interesting challenge to theories about legislative bargaining and logrolling.
4. Richard Briffault, The Item Veto in State Courts, 66
(1993).
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Some theorists view the legislative process as a form of multimember
bargaining where certain provisions are included to gain the consent
of legislators whose votes were required for a bill to pass. It is impossible to pick apart the elements of the bargain after a bill is enacted
and conclude that the bill would still have become a law even if a
certain provision were deleted. In the many item veto states, however,
the governor can rewrite the legislative bargain, and unless two-thirds
of each house of the legislature disagree, the governor's version be5
comes the law.

This raises another interesting question. The legislature knows
the governor has the power to rewrite a budget bill and delete key
elements: Why do they let this happen? What is the point of putting
something in a bill if the legislature cannot protect it from a gubernatorial veto? Why doesn't the legislature get the governor's agreement
in advance, and condition their passage of what the governor wants on
the governor's acceptance of the budget bill as they pass it? This may
happen some times, but often the governor's item veto is a surprise
that can undo deals made within the legislature.
Some states utilize other interesting permutations of the veto. Illinois and New Jersey, for example, have what is called the amendatory or suspensory veto. 6 The governor effectively says, "I won't
accept the bill as it currently stands, but if you change it the following
way, it's accepted." The governor actually submits the language to
the legislature. If the legislature accepts the governor's changes, the
bill becomes a law. In a sense, the governor becomes an initiator of
legislative language with the legislature merely responding to the governor's proposal. It's an interesting flip of the traditional relationship
between the executive and the legislature.
Indeed, in some areas the executive plays a key role in initiating
the legislative process. In adopting budgets, for example, some states
have constitutionalized a leading role for the governor. The governor
is authorized to draft the state's budget and the legislature must react
to the executive's budget before it can consider any budgetary actions
of its own. The governor sets the budgetary agenda and the legislature
must work with the governor's proposal. Moreover, given the central
role of the budget in shaping a state's general legislative program, the
executive budget may set the agenda for much of the legislative process. In many cities, the pattern is the same, with the Mayor setting
5. Id. at 1176, 1181.
6. Daniel S. Strouse, The Structure of AppropriationsLegislation and the Governor's Item Veto Power: The Arizona Experience, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 113, 119 n.25

(1994).
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the budgetary and legislative agenda, and the City Council reacting to
mayoral initiatives. In these states and cities, the usual assumptions
about the roles of executive and legislature in the legislative process
are reversed.
States and localities depart from the federal model of separation
of powers in many other ways. Some states allow the legislature to
participate in the executive process by providing for legislative appointments or joint executive-legislative appointments to administrative agencies, or by enabling legislators or their designees to sit on
certain administrative agencies. Many important policy matters are
resolved at state and local levels by executive order. At the local level
there is often a complete blurring of the distinction between executive
and legislature. Many localities do not even have a chief executive.
They may be governed by a multimember commission or council
rather than a single executive. In these settings, lawmaking and administration, and legislation and regulation, are fused.
Finally, our understanding of the legislative process at the subnational level is complicated by the existence of various institutions that
provide for broader popular participation in lawmaking, and thus create alternatives to the legislature. These alternatives include direct democracy, elected judiciaries, and relatively easy procedures for
amending state constitutions.
One of the hallmarks of governance at the state and local level is
direct democracy. Nearly all states provide for voter referenda for at
least some measures, particularly for certain fiscal matters such as
bond issues. With a referendum requirement, a bill passed by the legislature and signed by the governor will not become law unless also
approved by the people. Many states also provide for optional referenda. Even if a bill has been enacted into law its effect can be suspended if opponents secure enough signatures to force a popular
referendum on the new law; at the referendum, a popular majority
against the law can nullify it. Even more dramatically, about half of
the states provide for voter-initiated legislation. If supported by
enough petition signatures, a proposal for new legislation or a constitutional amendment can be placed on the ballot. If the voters approve
the measure, it becomes law even though it has never been considered,
let alone approved, by the legislature. This can have a powerful impact on legislation. For more than twenty-five years, government and
politics in California, our largest state, have been strongly shaped by
voter initiatives, which have curbed taxes, changed the procedures for
adopting new taxes, mandated new expenses, imposed term limits, and
addressed campaign finance laws. Voter initiatives give the voters, or
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perhaps those interest groups who are able to mobilize large groups of
voters, a direct say in the making of law.
State and local legislation is also subject to implementation and
interpretation by elected judges. The vast majority of state judges are
elected-mostly for long terms, but usually for much shorter terms
than the life tenure enjoyed by federal judges. Moreover, judicial
elections are increasingly politicized; judges and judicial candidates
raise significant funds and campaign for votes, and other organizations
engage in substantial independent spending efforts to support or oppose the election of particular judges. Additionally, state judges may
participate in legislation not only by interpreting legislative end-products but also by issuing advisory opinions about the constitutionality
of pending legislative proposals. The United States Supreme Court
has stated that federal courts may not issue advisory opinions, 7 but
advisory opinions are available to state supreme courts in many states,
and legislatures in those states may ask courts for comments on legislative proposals-which can include approval, disapproval, and approval in part and disapproval in part-prior to enactment.
Finally, legislation at the state level may be affected by the very
detailed nature of most state constitutions. This relates to my earlier
point about direct democracy, because many state constitutions can be
amended by voter initiative, and such measures certainly contribute to
the length and substantive detail of state constitutions. But detailed
constitutions are not limited to states with the initiative; nearly all state
constitutions are far longer and contain far more provisions mandating
or constraining substantive policies in crucial areas such as taxation,
finance, law enforcement, and the delivery of public services. California, for example, mandates that a substantial portion of the state
budget go to education." This can directly affect the substance of state
lawmaking and state budgets. Many state constitutions also impose
special procedural rules, such as supermajority rules for new taxes or
tax increases, that affect legislative process as well as substance.
I hope these comments provide a sense of the richness and complexity of lawmaking and governance at the state and local level. We
are a federal system, but most scholarly analysis is focused on the
national government. Greater study of legislative structures and procedures outside the federal government can give us a far better sense
of the many alternative ways of designing and reforming legislative
processes and making legislation.
7. United States Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S.
439, 446 (1993) (citing Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975)).
8. See CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 8 (amended 1988).
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